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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-TITLE VII-SEX
DISCRIMINATION-HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HA-
RASSMENT-The United States Supreme Court held that an
employer's conduct need not seriously affect an employee's psy-
chological well-being or cause the employee to suffer tangible
injury to be actionable as hostile work environment harassment
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
Teresa Harris began work at Forklift Systems, Inc. ("Fork-
lift"), an equipment rental company, in April of 1985.1 She
worked as a manager in the leased equipment department and
as a coordinator in the sales department during her period of
employment.' The president of the company, Charles Hardy,
was Harris' immediate supervisor? During Harris' two and one-
half years of employment with Forklift, Hardy repeatedly made
derogatory comments to Harris regarding her gender.' Addition-
ally, he directed many sexual innuendos toward her.' A number
of these remarks were made in front of other employees.6 In
August of 1987, Harris spoke with Hardy about his discriminato-
ry treatment of her.' Hardy responded by stating that he was
surprised that Harris had been offended by his remarks, stated
that he had only been joking, and apologized.' Furthermore,
Hardy promised to stop the offensive behavior.9 Several weeks
1. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993) (No. 92-1168). Forklift employed a total of six managers: four males, Harris,
and another female who was the daughter of Forklift's president. Petitioner's Brief
at 3.
3. Petitioner's Brief at 3.
4. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 369. For example, Hardy had stated to Harris on
several occasions, "you're a woman, what do you know?" Id.
5. Id. Once he suggested that Harris go to a hotel with him to negotiate her
raise. Id. Hardy also occasionally asked Harris and other female employees to re-




9. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 369.
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later, Hardy asked Harris if she had promised to have sex with
one of Forklift's customers in exchange for the customer making
a business deal with Forklift."° Shortly thereafter, Harris quit
her job.11
Consequently, Harris commenced a Title VII action against
Forklift, claiming that Hardy's behavior had created an abusive
work environment." The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee adopted the recommendation of a
magistrate and held that Hardy's conduct had not created an
abusive work environment." The court found that although
Harris had been offended by some of Hardy's comments, as a
reasonable woman would have been, she had not suffered seri-
ous damage to her psychological well-being. 4 Harris appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.5
The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the district court in
an unpublished opinion." Ultimately, Harris appealed this de-
cision to the United States Supreme Court." The Court granted
certiorari" to resolve whether an employer's conduct must seri-
ously affect an employee's psychological well-being or cause the
employee to suffer tangible injury in order to be actionable as
abusive work environment harassment under Title VII.'9
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, began the
opinion by noting that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibited employers from discriminating against employees be-
cause of their gender.2" In the past, the Court had interpreted
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Harris argued that these actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Petitioner's Brief at 10-11. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer
to discriminate against an employee on the basis of that employee's sex. 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
13. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 369.
14. Id. at 370. The district court followed precedent in its circuit by focusing
on Harris' psychological well-being. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 3-89-0557,
1991 WL 487444, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991), afld, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.
1992), reu'd, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Corp., 805 F.2d
611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). Other circuits, however,
did not require that the plaintiff suffer serious damage to her psychological well-
being. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991).
15. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
16. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 367 (1993).
17. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
18. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993).
19. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
20. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act") makes it "an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
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this statute to prohibit employers from requiring employees to
work in a discriminatorily abusive environment.2 The Court
reaffirmed that an employer violated Title VII when it created
an abusive working environment for an employee through dis-
crimination.22 The Court also reasserted that in order for an
employer to be in violation of Title VII, its conduct must have
been more than merely offensive to the employee.2"
The Court then held that an abusive work environment did
not necessarily have to cause a tangible injury to the plaintiff.2 4
The Court noted that Title VII protected an employee before his
employer's harassing conduct caused the employee to suffer a
nervous breakdown.25 An employee's work performance, length
of employment, and career advancement, the Court reasoned,
could be affected by a discriminatorily abusive work environ-
ment even if the employee's psychological well-being was not
seriously affected.2" The Court also noted that for a particular
work environment to be considered abusive, both a reasonable,
objective person and the affected employee must find that the
employer's behavior altered the employee's working condi-
tions.27 Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the dis-
trict court had erred in ruling that Harris' work environment
was not abusive because Hardy's conduct had not seriously af-
fected her psychological well-being or caused her to suffer tangi-
ble injury.28 The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
2(a)(1) (1988).
21. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 64 (1986)). Meritor involved a sexual harassment claim by a female bank em-
ployee against her employer and her male supervisor. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. In
that case, the Court defined an abusive work environment as one in which enough
discriminatory insult and ridicule is present to alter the employee's working condi-
tions. Id. at 67. Furthermore, the Court held that Title VII violations could occur
absent economic or tangible discrimination. Id. at 64. The Court noted that Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination with respect to one's " 'terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent to 'strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women.' 
" 
Id. (quoting Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)).
See notes 63-74 and accompanying text for further discussion of Meritor.




26. Id. at 371.
27. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. The Court noted that if the employer's conduct
was not objectively abusive or if the employee did not consider the conduct to be
abusive, the conduct was beyond the scope of Title VII. Id.
28. Id. at 371. To be actionable under Title VII, a work environment need not
cause an employee to suffer psychological injury as long as the employee and an
objective person would perceive it to be abusive. Id. at 370.
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by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded.29
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court
had not set forth a clear standard for determining whether a
work environment was abusive.3" He noted that although the
Court could formulate an absolute standard, it would be con-
trary to the statute because the statute did not permit limiting
the methods for determining abusiveness.3 He stated that he
knew of no standard "more faithful to the inherently vague stat-
utory language" than that which the Court adopted, and thus,
joined the majority opinion.32
In a separate concurrence, Justice Ginsburg stated that in
determining whether a work environment was abusive, courts
should focus on whether the employer's conduct unreasonably
interfered with the employee's work performance.3" In her opin-
ion, an actual decrease in productivity should not be required;
rather, courts should focus on whether the harassment made the
job more difficult to perform.34
Eradicating discrimination in the workplace is a relatively
new concept in American jurisprudence. Congress drafted Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"s (the "Act") with the intent
of eliminating employment discrimination that was based on
race, color, religion, or national origin. 6 Interestingly, sex was
not originally included as one of the bases on which discrimina-
tion would no longer be permitted. 7 A few months before the
passage of Title VII, a House member offered an amendment to
the Act that would also make it unlawful for employers to dis-
criminate against employees based on their sex. s That amend-
29. Id. at 371.
30. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring). He asserted that the Court's require-
ment that a reasonable, objective person consider the environment abusive, did not
define a standard that juries could use in determining whether the employer's con-
duct warranted an award of damages. Id.
31. Id.
32. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
33. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
34. Id. This determination could be made by concluding that a reasonable
person would have found the job more difficult due to the altered working conditions
that resulted from the harassment. Id.
35. See note 20 for the relevant portion of the Act.
36. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (1964). Title VII established the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and delegated to that
agency the primary responsibility to enforce the Act and eliminate employment dis-
crimination from the workplace. Id.
37. 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2401.
38. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964). Representative Smith proposed the amend-
ment "to prevent discrimination against another minority group, the women." Id. He
read a letter from a woman who presented figures from the 1960 census that
176 Vol. 33:173
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ment was passed by a vote of fifty-six percent of the House."
Since Title VII's inception, courts have adjudicated many
cases that have required interpretation of various sections of the
Act. In 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recognized that an employee had a right to have his
psychological well-being protected from employer abuse in Rog-
ers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." Rogers
was the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon a
discriminatory work environment. 1 In Rogers, the court was
confronted with a Hispanic employee's claim that her employers,
who were optometrists, fired her because of her national ori-
gin.4" She also claimed that her employers segregated their mi-
nority patients.' The court considered whether the segregation
of the patients was offensive enough to the employee to have
changed her working environment." The court reasoned that
Title VII's broad purpose of eliminating the inconvenience, un-
fairness, and humiliation of discrimination dictated that an
employee's psychological, as well as economic, well-being should
be protected." It held that the segregation of the patients,
which was discriminatory, could have created a working environ-
ment that was discriminatory toward the minority employee.'
The court concluded that a working environment that was heavi-
ly charged with racial or ethnic discrimination was actionable
under Title VII. 7
In 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Bundy v. Jackson," expanded the definition of a
showed that women were actually a majority group. Id. Furthermore, he stated that
"women have some real grievances and some real rights to be protected." Id. The
principal argument against the amendment was set forth by Representative Celler
who read from a letter written by the United States Department of Labor, which
contended that sex discrimination was sufficiently different from the other types of
discrimination already included in the Act to warrant separate legislative treatment.
Id. The House members continued to debate until a vote was ordered. Id. at 2584.
39. 110 CONG. REC. at 2584.
40. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
41. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
42. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236. The employee's charge stated that her employers
had terminated her not because of her work, but because of friction between her
and her Caucasian coworkers. Id.
43. Id. The court did not know what the employee meant by this charge, so
the majority of the court interpreted it to mean that the optometrists provided dif-
ferent treatment to their patients depending on the patients' ethnic origins. Id. at
237.
44. Id. at 237-38.
45. Id. at 238.
46. Id. at 239.
47. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
48. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
1994
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discriminatory work environment to include one in which an em-
ployee was discriminated against because of her sex. Bundy was
the first decision to resolve in the affirmative the issue of wheth-
er Title VII could be violated where an employer created a dis-
criminatory work environment, yet the employee did not lose
any tangible job benefits as a result of the discrimination.49 In
Bundy, a female corrections officer was regularly propositioned
by some of her male supervisors."0 The employee claimed that
her employer illegally delayed her promotion because she reject-
ed her supervisors' advances and subsequently filed a discrimi-
nation complaint with the corrections agency.5' The court stat-
ed that prior Title VII cases, which recognized that discriminato-
ry work environments were actionable, dictated that work envi-
ronments that were filled with sexual harassment should also be
actionable.52 The court emphasized that the sexual harassment
need not result in a loss of tangible benefits to the employee in
order to be actionable.53 In Bundy, the court determined that
because the employee was subjected to demeaning propositions
and insults, her resultant anxiety and debilitation established a
Title VII violation. 5'
49. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943-44.
50. Id. at 940. The district court found that in the corrections agency, "the
making of improper sexual advances to female employees [was] standard operating
procedure, a fact of life, a normal condition of employment." Id. at 939. At one
point, the female employee complained to a male supervisor about her immediate
supervisor's propositions. Id. at 940. He replied that "any man in his right mind
would want to rape you." Id.
51. Id. at 939.
52. Id. at 943-45. These prior Title VII cases concerned discrimination based
on race, religion, national origin, and sexual stereotyping. Id.
The court further supported its decision by looking at guidelines that the
EEOC had issued in 1980 that included sexual harassment as a form of sex discrim-
ination prohibited by Title VII. Id. at 947. These guidelines provide:
(a) . . Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection
of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of un-
reasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an in-
timidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a) (1980)).
Generally speaking, there are two types of sexual harassment. See Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). The first type is quid pro quo ha-
rassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993). This type of harassment is directly linked
to the grant or denial of an employee's economic benefits. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
The second type is hostile environment harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). Hos-
tile environment harassment is the focus of this note.
53. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 948.
54. Id. at 944.
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Although the United States Supreme Court had yet to rule on
whether a hostile work environment caused by sexual harass-
ment was actionable as a form of sex discrimination under Title
VII, circuit courts were deciding the issue in the affirmative."
In Henson v. City of Dundee,"5 the Eleventh Circuit drew sup-
port from both Rogers and Bundy in deciding whether an
employer's creation of a hostile work environment due to sexual
harassment was a violation of Title VLI. 7 In Henson, the court
was faced with a female police dispatcher's claim that the chief
of the city police department sexually harassed her to the point
where she was forced to resign from her job.5" The court noted
that the Rogers rationale allowed courts to interpret a discrimi-
natory work environment to include one in which an employee
was discriminated against because of her sex. 9 The court also
noted that an employer could violate Title VII by creating a
hostile work environment regardless of whether an employee
suffered economic loss.' The Eleventh Circuit ultimately con-
cluded that the dispatcher had established a prima facie" case
of a Title VII violation. 2
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court finally ruled on the
issue of whether a hostile work environment created by sexual
harassment was actionable as a form of sex discrimination un-
der Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson." In Meritor, a
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
56. 682 F.2d 897 (lth Cir. 1982).
57. Henson, 682 F.2d at 902-04.
58. Id. at 899. The dispatcher claimed that the male chief used vulgar lan-
guage, regularly inquired about her sexual habits, and repeatedly asked her to have
sexual relations with him. Id.
59. Id. at 901-02. The court stated:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for mem-
bers of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement
that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privi-
lege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Id. at 902.
60. Id. at 901. The court noted that the EEOC guidelines were "useful and
informative" to its decision. Id. at 903.
61. Prima facie comes from the Latin for "at first sight.' BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 1189 (6th ed. 1990). A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when
the evidence in his favor is such that it "will prevail until contradicted and
overcome by other evidence." Id.
62. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905. The court concluded that the dispatcher was
entitled to try to prove only her claim of hostile work environment harassment on
remand to the district court. Id. at 908. The court deferred to the district court's
determination that the dispatcher had not suffered quid pro quo harassment. Id. at
907-08.
63. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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female bank employee brought an action against her male super-
visor for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. The em-
ployee claimed that once she had received her first promotion,
her supervisor began making sexual advances toward her."
The employee contended that she did not welcome the advances
and acquiesced because she was afraid of losing her job.6
In Meritor, the Supreme Court began by noting that discrimi-
nation did not have to be economic or tangible in order to be
actionable.67 It noted that the language of Title VII prohibited
all types of discrimination." The Court then examined the
guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") which provided that sexual harassment was
prohibited where it unreasonably interfered with an employee's
work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive work environment. 9 The Court agreed with the EEOC's
guidelines that an employee did have an actionable claim under
Title VII if the employer's sexual discrimination created a hos-
tile or abusive work environment for that employee.7" Further-
more, the Court held that in order to be abusive, a work envi-
ronment must change an employee's working conditions.71
The Meritor Court then ruled that the lower court had erred
in focusing on the bank employee's consensual engagement in
sexual intercourse with her supervisor.72 The opinion stated
64. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. The employee had worked at the bank for four
years and had advanced from a position as a teller-trainee to an assistant branch
manager. Id. It was undisputed at the district court bench trial that the employee's
promotions had been based on merit alone. Id.
65. Id. Up until that point, he had treated her in a "fatherly way." Id. Shortly
after she had received her promotion, he invited her to dinner. Id. At dinner, he
suggested that they go to a motel and have sexual relations. Id. At first she re-
fused, but she eventually agreed for fear of losing her job. Id. Thereafter, she had
sexual intercourse with him several times during the course of her employment. Id.
66. Id. The employee claimed that her supervisor demanded sexual favors
during and after business hours. Id. Some of the demands were made in front of
other employees. Id.
67. Id. at 64.
68. Id.
69. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66. See note 52 for the EEOC guidelines. The
Court recognized that while interpretations of administrative agencies did not control
the courts, they provided experienced and informed guidance. Id. at 65 (quoting
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). Justice Marshall noted in a
concurring opinion that the guidelines were "entitled to great deference." Meritor,
477 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring). The Court went on to note that the EEOC
guidelines supported the Court's view that discrimination need not be economic in
order to violate Title VII. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
70. Id. at 66.
71. Id. at 67. Prior to this decision, the Court had not enunciated a standard
for determining whether an employee's working conditions had been sufficiently al-
tered to constitute a violation of Title VII. Id.
72. Id. at 68. The Court stated that the fact that the employee's conduct was
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that when courts decided sexual harassment cases, the main
focus was whether the employee's conduct indicated that the
employer's actions were unwelcome, not whether the employee's
actual conduct was voluntary.7"
With Meritor, the Supreme Court established that a hostile
work environment due to sexual harassment was actionable
under Title VII even though an employee had suffered no eco-
nomic or tangible harm.74 In the cases that arose after Meritor,
the circuit courts adjudicated more narrow issues. In Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Company,75 the Sixth Circuit adjudicated the
issue of whether an employer's sexually harassing conduct must
seriously affect the psychological well-being of an employee to be
actionable under Title VII.75 In Rabidue, a female employee
was discharged because of many work-related problems.77 She
subsequently brought an action against her employer claiming
Title VII violations. 8 The district court found for the employ-
er.79 The circuit court reviewed the factual findings of the dis-
trict court and ultimately affirmed the judgment.0 In affirming
that judgment, the circuit court set forth various requirements
that must be met for employees to succeed in an action for a
Title VII violation.8' One of those requirements was that the
voluntary was not a defense in a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII.
Id.
73. Id. The Court opined that problems of proof arose when the focus was
shifted to the employee's reception of the employer's actions. Id. The trier of fact
must largely base its determination of whether the actions were unwelcome on the
credibility of the parties. Id. The Court also decided that the district court had not
erred in admitting evidence of the bank employee's "dress and personal fantasies."
Id. It stated that the evidence was obviously relevant to whether the employee
welcomed her supervisor's advances. Id. at 69. The district court had the discretion
to determine whether the probative value of such evidence was outweighed by its
prejudicial value. Id.
74. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
75. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
76. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
77. id. at 615. Her employer stated that the reasons for her discharge were
her opinionated personality and her inability to work with others. Id.
78. Id. The employee contended that she was the subject of both sexual ha-
rassment and sexual discrimination. Id. at 614. She claimed that she had been sex-
ually harassed by a fellow employee who was extremely vulgar. Id. at 615. Manage-
ment was aware of this male employee's obscene behavior, but had not been able to
curb it. Id. The female employee also was subjected to pictures of scantily clad wom-
en that her male coworkers displayed in their work areas. Id.
79. Id. at 614.
80. Id. at 618. The circuit court recognized the wide disparity between the
employee's testimony and that of her employer and deferred to the district court's
determinations of credibility. Id. at 618 n.3.
81. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619-20. The court set forth the requirements because,
prior to Rabidue, it had not addressed a claim of a Title VII violation based upon a
sexually discriminatory work environment that had not resulted in a tangible job
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employer's sexual harassment must seriously affect the psycho-
logical well-being of the employee.82 The court also required
that the employer's conduct must be offensive to both the affect-
ed employee and a reasonable person."
In Ellison v. Brady," a case decided by the Ninth Circuit
more than four years after the Sixth Circuit decided Rabidue,
the court reached a different conclusion regarding whether an
employee must suffer psychological injury to maintain an action-
able claim under Title VII.5  Ellison involved a female
employee's claim of sexual harassment by a male coworker."
The circuit court opined that the male coworker's conduct did
not rise to the level of forcible rape, but did involve more than
the utterance of an epithet." Therefore, earlier cases did not
dictate the result in this case, but only provided guidance to the
court.88 The court ultimately concluded that the female employ-
ee had an actionable claim under Title VII."5 Furthermore, the
court asserted that employees need not have their psychological
well-being affected to the point where they suffer anxiety and
debilitation.' The court also noted that Title VII began to pro-
tect employees long before they required psychiatric help for en-
during sexual harassment.91
At this time, it seems firmly established that an employee
detriment. Id. at 619. In drafting the requirements, the court considered the EEOC
guidelines and legal precedent. Id.
82. Id. at 619-20. In the Rabidue case, the district court found that the work
environment, while annoying, did not seriously affect the psychological well-being of
the female employee. Id. at 622.
83. Id. at 620.
84. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
85. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78.
86. Id. at 873-74. The male coworker worked in the same office as the female
employee and became increasingly preoccupied with the employee. Id. He wrote her
letters and pestered her when she was at work. Id.
87. Id. at 877. The court was referring to earlier cases that defined sexual
harassment. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
88. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877. The court acknowledged the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in Rabidue and openly rejected it. Id. The court stated that Rabidue's require-
ment that an employee's psychological well-being must be seriously affected for that
employee to have an actionable claim was not consistent with the language in
Meritor. Id. at 877-78.
89. Id. at 878. The court held that a female employee established a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleged that her em-
ployer acted in such a manner that a reasonable woman would consider the
employer's behavior to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter her conditions of
employment and to create an abusive working environment. Id. at 879. The court
emphasized that it was the employer's "conduct which must be pervasive or severe,




may successfully bring an action against his employer under
Title VII if that employer created a hostile or abusive work envi-
ronment for that employee because of sexual harassment.92
Both times that this issue has come before the Supreme Court,
in Meritor and Harris, the Court has affirmed the allowance of
such an action. It also seems quite clear that an employee does
not need to suffer tangible injury or have his psychological well-
being seriously affected because of his employer's sexual harass-
ment. Harris resolved this issue which arose among the circuit
courts after Meritor.
What does not seem very clear is how courts should determine
whether a particular work environment is hostile. The Court
stated in Meritor that Title VII was violated when a workplace
is permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult.""3 It stated that discriminatory conduct must be severe
or pervasive enough to alter the employee's working condi-
tions.94 That standard was reaffirmed by the Court in Harris.
In Harris, the Court determined that for conduct to be action-
able, it must do more than merely offend an employee, yet it
need not cause the employee to suffer tangible psychological
injury. 5 The Court did not determine at what point in this
gamut conduct does become actionable. Justice Scalia was cor-
rect when he noted in Harris that the Court had not established
a clear standard.
Without clear guidelines that define a hostile work environ-
ment, courts and juries will have to rely on their own sense of
when an employer has crossed over the line to sexual harass-
ment. 6 This could lead to wide-scale inconsistencies in verdicts
and damages. On the other hand, it could also lead to results
that are quite fitting to each particularized situation. Sexual
harassment claims are quite individualized and the juries and
courts will be free to use their own judgment in determining if
what occurred was actually sexual harassment.
The Court has liberally interpreted Title VII and given much
92. The words "hostile' and "abusive" are used interchangeably in this note.
The EEOC guidelines refer to an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive working envi-
ronment." 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a)(3) (1993). The Supreme Court used the word "abu-
sive" in Meritor and used it again, extensively, in Harris. In fact, Justice Scalia
noted in Harris that he took "abusive" and "hostile" to mean the same thing in the
context of that case. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
94. Id. at 67.
95. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. The Court admitted that it was taking a "mid-
dle path" but did not further define this "middle path" approach. Id. at 370-71.
96. Id. at 372 (Scalie, J., concurring).
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credence to the EEOC guidelines. The Court's reasons justify
this interpretation. Consequently, sexual harassment has be-
come a hot topic in corporate America. Fortunately, both employ-
ers and employees are becoming more aware of the new rules
that are developing with regard to workplace relationships.
In many instances, it seems that employers are overreacting
to these new standards. At the least, many employers are con-
cerned that they may be charged with sexual harassment if an
employee takes offense at the employer's unintentional conduct.
It is clear from the current law that if an employer makes an
offensive remark once to an employee and the remark does not
change the employee's working conditions, the employee does
not have an actionable claim. However, the law does allow an
employee redress in situations where the employer's harassment
has changed the employee's working conditions.
The increased awareness of sexual harassment and the ensu-
ing caution that have resulted from Meritor and Harris may
outweigh the concerns that burden employers. The new policies
that many employers will probably choose to adopt in the future
regarding sexual harassment may inconvenience some of the
employers, but the employees, and thus, the entire company,
will undoubtedly be benefitted by a less threatening and more
enjoyable work environment.
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